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Why do half of new Swiss companies close within five years?

My individual research and data analysis project, in full. I collected official Swiss statistics, analysed them in Power BI, and researched every explanation against at least two sources to find out which new companies survive, and why.

Salman ShaikOctober 202635 min read

50.7%of new Swiss companies still exist after five years

Why do half of new Swiss companies close within five years, and what makes the other half survive?

DataBFS company demography (26 cantons, 2013 to 2023), BFS STATPOP, Swiss Venture Capital Report 2026, and 30+ verified sources
Methods and toolsPower BI, Excel, issue tree, PESTEL, Five Forces, scenario planning
TimeOne week
My roleIndividual project: framing, data collection, cleaning, analysis, research and writing

This page is the complete study, the same content as the 45-page PDF, rebuilt for reading on screen. It is organised the way a consulting report is: the answer first, then the evidence, then what to do about it. Use On this page to jump to any section, and follow the links to the blog posts that explain each finding in more depth.

Every number comes from an official or published source, listed at the end. Anything I call a possible explanation, a rating or a likelihood is my own judgement and is marked as such.

Executive summary · 2 min read

The answer in two minutes

New Swiss companies mostly fail because of how they start and which market they enter, not because of where they are or how much money they raise.

50.7%survive five years (2018 founding cohort, Switzerland)
46.8%survival in Zug, the canton that founds the most companies per resident
63%survival in health, the only sector protected by licences
38%survival in hospitality, the lowest of any sector
49 → 68%survival from one-person starts to firms with 10+ employees
32%of Swiss venture capital now goes to AI startups (5% two years earlier)

The answer in five points

  1. How a company starts matters most. Solo starts survive 49%, teams of 10 or more 68%. A GmbH or AG, which needs share capital, survives better than a sole proprietorship. Section 5
  2. Which market it enters comes next. Easy-entry, crowded sectors (hospitality, retail, IT services, consulting) survive worst; health, protected by qualifications, survives best. Section 3
  3. Location matters less, and mostly through the type of company a place attracts. Zug founds 2.5 times more companies per resident than Zurich, and keeps the fewest. Section 2
  4. Money does not explain survival. Venture capital reaches about 350 of more than 46,000 new companies a year. Lucerne gets almost none and survives as well as Zurich. Section 4
  5. AI is not yet the main cause of failure, but it crowds knowledge work, pulls capital to a few AI firms, and makes the AI decision itself a risk for small companies. Section 7
RememberThe survivors start with a team, enter a market with a real barrier or stable demand, and keep their early bets small and reversible.
Note · what cannot be proven yetAI's direct effect on five-year survival. The data that would show it, the 2023 founding cohort at year five, will only be published around 2030. Everything about AI in this report is strong circumstantial evidence, not proof.

Part 1: The data, what happens and where

Part 1 · Method · 4 min read

01 The question and how I answered it

One sharp question, five testable parts, and only official data to test them.

At a glance Method
  • Main question: why do half of new Swiss companies close within five years, and what makes the other half survive?
  • Split into five parts: regions, sectors, money, size, AI.
  • Data: BFS company demography, BFS population, Swiss Venture Capital Report 2026.

Only 50.7% of the companies founded in Switzerland in 2018 still existed five years later. For every two new companies, one was gone by 2023. A founding boom means little if half of it disappears.

The issue tree

Consultants break a big question into parts that do not overlap and together cover the whole (a "MECE" issue tree). Each part got a hypothesis before I looked at the data:

#Sub-questionStarting hypothesisResult
1Regions: which cantons do well, and why?High-founding cantons survive lessSupported §2
2Sectors: which industries survive?Hype sectors survive worse than averageSupported §3
3Money: does funding decide survival?Low-funding regions survive lessRejected §4
4Size: does how you start matter?Teams survive longer than solo foundersSupported §5
5AI: who gains, who loses?AI creates winners and losersPartly, not yet provable §7
RememberA rejected hypothesis is a result, not a failure. Hypothesis 3 was wrong, and that turned out to be one of the most useful findings.

The data, and why each source

DataSourceWhy this source
Survival of new companies by canton, sector, size, legal formBFS company demographyCounts only genuinely new companies, excludes mergers, relaunches and holdings, and follows each founding year for five years
New companies, closures, active companies per canton and industry, 2013–2023BFS STAT-TABGives counts, not only rates
Population per canton, end of 2023BFS STATPOP, cantonal statistics officesTurns counts into comparable rates per 1,000 residents
Venture capital by sector, canton and round, 2025Swiss Venture Capital Report 2026The only complete record of Swiss startup funding
Side noteThe raw BFS files came in German and Italian, with merged headers and footnotes. I translated them, put one value per row, mapped standard canton codes and left unavailable values blank instead of zero, so they could not distort averages.

Three design choices

  • Why the 2018 cohort: it is the most recent founding year with a full five years of follow-up (2018 to 2023). BFS data runs about two years behind.
  • Why five cantons: each plays a different role. Zurich is the hub, Basel-Stadt the life-science cluster, Zug the formation machine, Lucerne the rising challenger, Bern the control case.
  • Why rates per 1,000 residents: Zurich has twelve times Zug's population, so raw counts would only measure size.
Key fact · quality checksThe cleaned canton data adds up to 46,883 new companies in 2023, against 46,931 published by BFS; the gap is cells BFS hides for confidentiality. The venture capital tables by canton and by sector both add up to exactly CHF 2,948m.

Part 1 · Finding 1 · 4 min read

02 Regions: Zug founds the most and keeps the fewest

More foundings do not mean a healthier ecosystem.

At a glance Finding 1
  • Zug creates 13.7 new companies per 1,000 residents, about 2.5 times Zurich.
  • Yet only 46.8% survive five years, the lowest of the five cantons, in 2013 and 2018 alike.
  • Zug is a revolving door: highest founding rate and highest closure rate.
New companies per 1,000 residents (2023) against 5-year survival (2018 cohort). Bubble size: venture capital per resident (2025).Built by Salman Shaik in Power BI · Data: BFS, SVCR
Map of Switzerland: five-year survival of new companies in the five study cantons Zurich 52.3%, Lucerne 52.0%, Bern 50.3%, Basel-Stadt 50.1%, Zug 46.8%. Other cantons are not part of the study. Zurich: 52.3% five-year survival (2018 founding year), 5.4 new companies per 1,000 residents (2023)Bern: 50.3% five-year survival (2018 founding year), 3.8 new companies per 1,000 residents (2023)Lucerne: 52.0% five-year survival (2018 founding year), 4.7 new companies per 1,000 residents (2023)Uri: not part of this studySchwyz: not part of this studyObwalden: not part of this studyNidwalden: not part of this studyGlarus: not part of this studyZug: 46.8% five-year survival (2018 founding year), 13.7 new companies per 1,000 residents (2023)Fribourg: not part of this studySolothurn: not part of this studyBasel-Stadt: 50.1% five-year survival (2018 founding year), 6.9 new companies per 1,000 residents (2023)Basel-Landschaft: not part of this studySchaffhausen: not part of this studyAppenzell Ausserrhoden: not part of this studyAppenzell Innerrhoden: not part of this studySt. Gallen: not part of this studyGraubünden: not part of this studyAargau: not part of this studyThurgau: not part of this studyTicino: not part of this studyVaud: not part of this studyValais: not part of this studyNeuchâtel: not part of this studyGeneva: not part of this studyJura: not part of this studyZug 46.8%Zurich 52.3%Lucerne 52.0%Bern 50.3%Basel-Stadt 50.1%
52% and above50 to 51%below 48%not in the study
Five-year survival of companies founded in 2018, by canton. Hover a canton for details. Map data: swiss-maps (Interactive Things, based on swisstopo); survival: BFS company demography.

Try it yourself:

Try it yourself:

CantonSurvival, 2013 cohortSurvival, 2018 cohortSolo starts, 2018New per 100 active, 2021Closures per 100 active, 2021
Zurich51.3%52.3%82%7.36.4
Lucerne48.7%52.0%81%6.95.8
Bern49.2%50.3%86%6.36.0
Basel-Stadt46.5%50.1%83%7.76.1
Zug46.7%46.8%77%10.37.5
Switzerland49.2%50.7%83%

Source: BFS company demography; own calculations.

What the data shows

  • Zug's weakness is structural. It was also last for the 2013 cohort, so this is not one bad year.
  • Size does not explain it. Zug has the fewest solo starts (77%), and solo starts survive worst nationally. On size alone, Zug should do better. Section 5
  • Lucerne is the quiet improver: survival up from 48.7% to 52.0%, the biggest gain, and the lowest closure rate.

Possible explanations for Zug (my hypotheses)

  • Foreign-owned companies: nationally they survive only 35% (Section 5), and Zug attracts many of them.
  • Mobile, tax-driven firms that can leave as easily as they arrive.
  • Crypto exposure: the 2018 cohort lived through crypto crashes in 2018 and 2022. But crypto explains only part of it. Section 12.5
Note · shell companies ruled outBFS company demography excludes holding companies and counts only firms with real market activity. Zug's low survival therefore comes from real operating companies, not mailbox shells.
RememberZug maximises volume, not durability. A canton that measures success by registrations will celebrate exactly the wrong number.

Go deeper in the blog post: Zug founds the most companies and keeps the fewest

Part 1 · Finding 2 · 4 min read

03 Sectors: the hype sectors survive below average

What a company does matters five times more than where it is.

At a glance Finding 2
  • Only 46% of new ICT and 47% of new finance companies reach year five, against 50.7% overall.
  • Health survives best (63%), hospitality worst (38%).
  • The sector gap (25 points) is about five times the canton gap (about 5 points).
5-year survival of companies founded in 2018, by sector. Dotted line: Swiss average (50.7%).Built by Salman Shaik in Power BI · Data: BFS

Try it yourself:

Key fact25 pointsbetween the best sector (health, 63%) and the worst (hospitality, 38%). Choosing health over hospitality changes the odds far more than choosing Zurich over Zug.

What the data shows

  • ICT and finance are below average, but not the worst. Trade, transport and hospitality do worse.
  • Construction, real estate and business services sit near the average: ordinary local businesses with steady demand.

Possible explanations

  • Low entry barriers: anyone with a laptop can open an IT or financial consulting firm.
  • Regulation as protection: health needs licences, which keep weak entrants out.
  • Stable demand: healthcare is needed in every cycle; software and fintech depend on funding cycles.
  • Thin margins in hospitality, plus COVID closures inside the five-year window.
→ Check this point in the five-forces analysis: health is the only sector with restricted entry. Section 11
RememberHype does not bring durability. The honest message is not "tech is the worst place to start" but "the sectors that get the most attention do not produce the most durable companies".

Go deeper in the blog post: Health survives at 63%, hospitality at 38%

Part 1 · Finding 3 · 4 min read

04 Money: venture capital does not explain survival

The hypothesis I got wrong, and why that matters.

At a glance Finding 3
  • Zug receives more VC per resident than Zurich and still survives worst.
  • Lucerne receives almost none and survives as well as Zurich.
  • VC reaches about 350 rounds a year against more than 46,000 new companies.
CantonVC 2025 (CHF m)Rounds 2025VC per resident (CHF)5-year survival
Basel-Stadt572.3182,86150.1%
Zug268.6302,02646.8%
Zurich1,192.515174552.3%
Bern≥ 17.814≥ 1750.3%
Lucerne0.110.352.0%

Source: Swiss Venture Capital Report 2026; survival BFS. Bern and Lucerne are not shown separately in the report: I rebuilt them from the list of individual rounds, so they are minimums.

Venture capital invested in 2025 by sector, CHF m. Green: health-related; red: ICT and fintech.Built by Salman Shaik in Power BI · Data: SVCR 2026

Try it yourself:

Side noteBFS "health" includes clinics and care homes; VC "biotech" means drug development. The sector comparison between the two sources is directional only.

Why money does not explain survival

  • VC reaches very few companies. Most new companies are bakeries, consultancies and tradespeople that never seek venture capital.
  • VC is a bet on fast growth, not on survival. Investors accept that most of their startups fail, as long as a few become very large.
  • Lucerne shows another model: self-funding, bank loans and steady local customers (a hypothesis to research).
  • At sector level, investors partly back the best survivors: health-related startups got about 45% of 2025 VC; ICT and fintech about 34%.
RememberVenture capital cannot explain the survival of companies it never touches.

Go deeper in the blog post: Money does not explain who survives

Part 1 · Finding 4 · 4 min read

05 Size: how a company starts matters most

The clearest pattern in the whole dataset: do not start alone.

At a glance Finding 4
  • 49% of one-person starts survive five years; 68% of companies starting with 10+ employees.
  • GmbH (56%) and AG (55%) beat sole proprietorships (48%). Foreign companies: 35%.
  • About 83% of new Swiss companies start with one employee: the weakest start is the most common.
5-year survival of companies founded in 2018, by number of employees at founding.Built by Salman Shaik in Power BI · Data: BFS

Try it yourself:

Try it yourself:

Legal form at founding5-year survival
GmbH (limited liability)56.1%
AG (public limited)54.8%
Cooperative52.0%
Sole proprietorship48.4%
Association or foundation43.1%
Partnership41.2%
Foreign company35.1%

Source: BFS, 2018 cohort.

What the data shows

  • The big jump is from one person to a small team: +10 points from 1 to 2–4 employees; 2–4 to 5–9 adds nothing.
  • Capital at the start helps: a GmbH needs CHF 20,000 and an AG CHF 100,000 of share capital.
  • Foreign companies survive worst, which links back to Zug. Section 2

Possible explanations

  • Capacity: one person must sell, deliver, do the accounts and absorb every setback.
  • Complementary skills: a team combines, for example, product and sales.
  • Commitment: hiring or putting in share capital signals a more serious, better-prepared project.
Note · correlation, not causeBetter-prepared founders may both hire more and survive more. Adding staff does not by itself make a company survive.
RememberThe message is "do not start alone", not "the bigger the better".

Go deeper in the blog post: Do not start alone: why solo founders close more often

Part 1 · Synthesis · 2 min read

06 How the factors connect

How a company starts matters more than where it is or what it raises.

5-year survival50.7% on average
2018 cohort
StrongestHow it startsSolo 49% vs 10+ employees 68%. GmbH 56% vs sole proprietor 48%. Foreign companies 35%.
StrongWhich sector it entersHealth 63% vs hospitality 38%. ICT 46% and finance 47%.
ModerateWhere it is locatedZurich 52.3% vs Zug 46.8%, about a 5-point spread.
No clear linkVenture capitalZug has high VC per resident and the lowest survival; Lucerne almost none and survives like Zurich.

Driver tree: own analysis of BFS and SVCR data. Ranking by the size of the survival gap each factor creates.

The factors also interact. Zug's low survival is not explained by size, since it has the fewest solo starts. It more likely comes from the kind of company Zug attracts: mobile, often foreign-owned firms in volatile fields such as crypto.

RememberLocation matters mostly through the type of company it attracts. Money matters least of the four.
→ Next: does AI change this picture? Section 7

Part 2: The AI question

Part 2 · Finding 5 · 7 min read

07 AI: who gains, who loses

AI is not the main reason companies fail today. It is reshaping who enters, who gets funded, and who gets replaced.

At a glance Finding 5
  • AI startups went from 5% to 32% of Swiss VC volume in two years.
  • After ChatGPT, foundings fell in AI-replaceable services and rose in advisory and marketing, the sectors with the highest closure rates.
  • Most AI projects show no measurable return; for small firms, the AI decision itself is a survival risk.
Note · what cannot be proven yetAI's direct effect on five-year survival. The data that would show it, the 2023 cohort at year five, will be published around 2030. This section is strong circumstantial evidence, not proof.

7.1 Where AI is boosting

MeasureFigureSource
Share of Swiss VC volume going to AI startups5% → 32% in two years; about CHF 1.1bn in 2025 (+206%)EY Startup Barometer 2026
Swiss funding rounds involving AI startups163 of 515 (32%)EY Startup Barometer 2026
AI/ML among new Swiss deep-tech startupsOne in four since 2022Swiss Deep Tech Report 2026
Swiss SMEs consciously using AI22% (2024) → 34% (2025)AXA/Sotomo via kmu.admin.ch
AI share of global venture capitalAbout 50% in 2025; 80% in Q1 2026Crunchbase via GCN

7.2 Where AI hurts: what Swiss founding data shows

I compared new company foundings in 2023, the first full year after ChatGPT, with 2022, using detailed BFS industry data.

IndustryAI exposureNew companies 2022→2023Closures per 100 active, 2021
Advertising and market researchHigh+15.8%9.0
Management consultingHigh+3.7%9.5
Information servicesHigh+3.5%10.0
Design, translation, photographyHigh−2.6%8.4
Legal, tax and accountingHigh−6.0%5.3
IT servicesHigh−7.1%7.9
PublishingHigh−14.6%6.1
Office and business supportHigh−15.6%8.6
HealthLow+16.7%5.1
Specialised construction tradesLow+5.8%6.0
Personal servicesLow+1.5%6.6
Restaurants and barsLow−9.3%5.6

Try it yourself:

Source: BFS company demography; own calculations. The exposure grouping is my judgement, based on the ILO 2025 index, which finds clerical work most exposed, followed by digital professional work in media, software and finance.

Key factFoundings in high-exposure industries fell 1.3%; in low-exposure industries they rose 7.1%. The national total was flat (−0.1%).

Doing businesses shrank

Office support, publishing, IT services, legal and accounting: work whose output AI can now produce.

Advising and selling businesses grew

Advertising and consulting: AI makes it cheap for one person to open such a shop.

RememberAI pulls founders into the most fragile sectors: advertising and consulting already had 9 to 10 closures per 100 firms a year, against 5.1 in health.

7.3 Is AI actually useful in each sector?

SectorWhat AI does thereEffect on companies
ICTCore productHelps; the only sector where AI is often the business model
Finance, pharmaAnalysis, compliance, researchHelps, mostly large firms
Consulting, marketingCheap content and analysisLowers entry barriers, which brings crowding
Translation, publishing, office supportDoes the core work itselfHurts
HealthAdmin supportNeutral; growth comes from demand
Construction, trade, hospitalityLittleIrrelevant; these fail for other reasons
RememberAI is valid where the work is text, code and data. The sectors with the most bankruptcies are physical and local, where AI barely matters.

7.4 Why AI fails where it fails

BarrierBest available numberSource
No measurable return95% of organisations saw no measurable P&L return within six monthsMIT NANDA, 2025
Projects abandoned42% dropped most AI initiatives (17% a year earlier); 46% of proofs of concept scrappedS&P Global, 2025
Money in the wrong placeAbout half of budgets go to sales and marketing; returns show up in back-office automationMIT NANDA
Shallow useAbout 60% of Swiss firms use AI; only 2% of micro-firms use it systematicallyUBS via Netzwoche
No data rulesOnly 34% of SMEs have rules for data entered into AI tools; 23% under 10 employeesAXA/Sotomo 2025
Data protectionLocal processing and data protection rated 8.7 / 10 in importanceEY Switzerland
Trust46% willing to trust AI; 66% rely on output without checking; 56% made mistakes because of AIKPMG & Univ. of Melbourne
RememberInvestors are not against AI. The problem is the opposite: AI absorbs so much capital that non-AI startups get less.

7.5 The snowball: how one company winning hurts another

Side note · solo foundersIn the US, about 36% of startups founded on Carta in 2025 had a solo founder, up from 31% in 2024. Switzerland shows no shift yet: about 83% of new firms start with one employee, as in 2013. If AI does push Swiss founders to start alone, Section 5 suggests survival would fall.
  1. Capital is pulled to the top. A few frontier labs absorb a large share of global funding; non-AI startups get less money at lower valuations. Swiss fintech fell from 41 rounds in 2024 to 30 in 2025 (SVCR).
  2. Big models squeeze the specialists. DeepL cut about 250 jobs, a quarter of its staff, and is still loss-making. If a translation AI champion is squeezed, human agencies are squeezed harder.
  3. Cheap tools pull founders into crowded markets that already have the highest closure rates.
  4. Established firms burn money on badly chosen AI projects, especially small firms with no data foundations.
  5. Meanwhile, the largest failure wave is not about AI. Construction, trade and hospitality lead the bankruptcies. Section 12

Go deeper in the blog post: AI in Swiss SMEs: who gains, who loses, and what gets dropped

Part 2 · Due diligence · 6 min read

08 The hidden denominator: why AI success rates mislead

"75% of companies succeed with AI" usually means 75% of the companies that got far enough to be asked.

At a glance Survey audit
  • Five well-known studies give AI success rates from 5% to 74%.
  • The difference comes from who was asked, what counted as success, and over what time.
  • For a small firm making one large bet, even a 25–30% failure rate is a survival risk.

8.1 How the studies were built

StudyWho was askedSuccess meansWindowResult
Google Cloud3,466 leaders at firms above USD 10m revenue, already using AIAny ROIFirst year74% achieving ROI
IBM2,000 CEOs in 33 countriesThe ROI they expectedLast few years25% delivered; 16% scaled
McKinsey1,993 participants in 105 countriesAny profit (EBIT) effectCurrent88% use; 39% any effect; 6% large
S&P GlobalCompanies surveyed in 2025Projects kept vs droppedOne year42% abandoned most initiatives
MIT NANDA300+ initiatives, 52 interviews, 153 leadersMeasurable P&L effectSix months95% no measurable return

Sources: CodeIT comparison of Google Cloud and MIT; IBM newsroom; McKinsey State of AI 2025 summary; S&P Global and MIT NANDA as in Section 7.

8.2 Five reasons the numbers disagree

  1. Who is in the sample. Google asked only firms that had already deployed AI; projects that died earlier were never counted. This is survivorship bias.
  2. What counts as success. "Any ROI" is far easier to reach than "the ROI we expected" or "a measurable effect on profit".
  3. The time window. A project can fail at six months and succeed at eighteen, or the reverse.
  4. Who answers. Executives rate projects they sponsored themselves: self-assessments, not measurements.
  5. Who publishes. Google and IBM sell AI products; McKinsey sells AI transformation work. That does not make the data wrong, but a careful reader notes it.

8.3 The hidden denominator

Inside one single study, McKinsey, 88 of every 100 organisations use AI, 39 see any effect on profit, and only 6 see a large effect of more than 5% of EBIT.

"88% use AI" and "6% get significant value" are both true at once. Which one makes the headline depends on the writer.

Key fact · illustrationIf about half of AI projects die before production (S&P: 46% of proofs of concept scrapped), a 74% success rate among deployed projects is closer to 40% of all projects started. This combines two samples: read it as a demonstration of the denominator problem, not a statistic.

8.4 Why even a 25–30% failure rate is a serious risk

  • Failure tells you where the AI does not fit. Klarna let an AI assistant handle two-thirds of customer conversations, the work of about 700 agents. In May 2025 its CEO admitted the result was lower quality and began hiring humans again. The AI worked for routine questions and failed on complex ones: the failures defined the boundary.
  • Failures are under-reported. Successes get press releases; failed projects are quietly dropped.
  • Gains are small, losses structural. Most firms reporting a profit effect say it is under 5% of EBIT; a failed rollout can mean layoffs, lost know-how, lost customers and costly rehiring.
  • Portfolio vs single bet. A large company can run 40 pilots and accept that a third fail. A small Swiss firm usually gets one bet.
RememberA 70% success rate is fine for many small, reversible experiments and dangerous for one large, irreversible bet. For small firms, the AI decision itself is a survival risk.
Note · the research gapA credible study would need every project started (including dropped ones), one definition of success, a fixed time window, an independent publisher, and results by sector and company size. None of the five has all six, and no Swiss sector-level figure exists. A short survey of Swiss SMEs could close this gap.

Go deeper in the blog post: The hidden denominator: why AI success rates mislead

Part 3: The consulting view, from findings to strategy

Part 3 · Toolkit · 2 min read

09 The toolkit: frameworks used

Standard consulting tools, each chosen to answer one specific question.

FrameworkOriginWhat it answers hereWhere
Hypothesis-driven issue treeStandard at McKinsey, BCG, BainSplits the main question into testable parts§1
PESTELClassic strategy toolWhich outside forces hit Swiss companies in 2026§10
Porter Five ForcesMichael Porter, HarvardHow much competitive pressure each sector faces§11
McKinsey 7SMcKinseyWhether a firm is internally ready for change, such as an AI rollout§16
Kotter 8 stepsJohn Kotter, HarvardHow transformation should be led, and where it breaks§16
Three HorizonsMcKinseyBalancing the core business against new bets§16
Scenario planningDeveloped at ShellWhat could happen to 2030 and what to watch§14
Pre-mortem, Agile/ScrumGary Klein; Scrum GuideHow small firms can test change in reversible steps§16
NoteIn Part 3, facts carry a source. Force ratings, strategy judgements and scenario likelihoods are my own reasoning, marked as such.

Part 3 · Environment · 3 min read

10 Switzerland in 2026: the environment

A recovery on fragile ground: tariffs, energy and the franc can turn quickly.

PESTEL factorWhat is happeningWho it hits
Political: US tariffs39% on Swiss goods from August 2025, cut to a 15% ceiling by the November 2025 deal; flat 10% since February 2026 after a US court ruling; up to 15% on pharma since April 2026 (economiesuisse)Pharma, watches, machinery and their Swiss suppliers
Economic: growthSECO raised its 2026 GDP forecast from 0.9% to 1.7%, helped by pharma and a weaker franc (SECO)Positive for exporters
Economic: ratesSNB rate at 0%; KOF expects one 0.25-point rise in December 2026, inflation about 0.6% (KOF via finews)Leveraged firms, construction, real estate
Economic: energy, conflictMiddle East conflict and high energy prices named as key risks by SECOHospitality, transport, manufacturing
Social: habitsLess alcohol, shorter lunches, online shopping, shopping across the borderRestaurants, shops
Technological: AIA third of Swiss VC; SME use 22% → 34% in a yearKnowledge work (§7)
Legal: bankruptcy lawSince 2025 tax and social-insurance claims go through bankruptcy proceedingsWeak firms with public debts; inflates statistics
Legal: health tariffsTARDOC replaced the 20-year-old TARMED tariff on 1 January 2026Doctors and outpatient practices
RememberFor most Swiss small firms, the biggest threats in 2026 are costs, demand and competition, not AI.

Part 3 · Five forces · 3 min read

11 Competitive pressure by sector

The sectors with the lowest survival face the highest combined pressure.

Sector5-yr survivalNew entrantsRivalrySubstitutesBuyer powerSupplier powerOverall
Hospitality38%HighHighMediumMediumHigh (rents, staff)Very high
Trade and retail44%HighHighHigh (online, Temu)HighMediumVery high
Transport45%MediumHighMediumHighHigh (fuel)High
ICT and IT services46%HighHighHigh (AI, offshore)HighLowHigh
Finance and insurance47%Low to highHighMediumHighMediumHigh
Professional services50%HighHighRising (AI)HighLowHigh
Construction51%MediumHighLowMediumHigh (materials)Medium–high
Health and social63%Low (licences)MediumLowLow (insured)MediumLow

Survival: BFS, 2018 cohort. Force ratings: my own assessment from the facts in this report.

Key factHealth is the only sector where entry is restricted by qualifications and licences, and it has by far the highest survival. Barriers to entry protect those who get in.
→ Check this point against the sector chart: Section 3

Part 3 · Sector deep dives · 16 min read

12 Eight sector deep dives

For each sector: the facts, where companies go wrong, how they could move, and what is likely next.

SectorSurvivalMain failure driverAI roleGo to
Hospitality38%Cost squeeze: rents, wages, energyMinor12.1
Retail and trade44%Platforms and cross-border shoppingIndirect12.2
Construction and trades51%Cash flow and pricingMinor12.3
IT services and software46%Hourly billing under AI pressureDirect threat12.4
Finance, fintech, crypto47%Funding and price cyclesMixed12.5
Health and life sciences63%Regulation and geopoliticsMinor12.6
Consulting and marketing≈50%Crowding, no nicheBoom and bust12.7
Translation, media, officen/aCustomers replace them with AIDirect replacement12.8
RememberAcross all eight sectors, the same three mistakes repeat: an irreversible bet before the concept is proven, no clear position, and one person carrying everything.

Sector deep dive · 38% survive

12.1 Hospitality

Hospitality fails through a cost squeeze, not lack of guests.

The facts

  • Restaurant revenue fell 4.8% and hotel revenue 0.9% in Q1 2026 against a year earlier (GastroSuisse/KOF).
  • Owners name staff shortages, rising rents, changing habits, falling sales and high staff costs; GastroSuisse says margins have eroded for years (Blick).
  • Chains share staff across sites and control costs better than single restaurants. Mountain hotels did well while city restaurants struggled.

Where it goes wrong

  1. The irreversible bet first: long lease and full fit-out before the concept is proven.
  2. Stuck in the middle: neither cheapest nor clearly special, Porter's weakest position.
  3. One person carries everything: chef, manager and accountant.
  4. No numbers: no tracking of cost per cover or staff cost share.

How they could move

  • Test before signing: pop-ups, shared kitchens, short leases.
  • Pick a clear position: a focused niche instead of serving everyone.
  • Share fixed costs with peers: staff pools, joint purchasing.
  • Simple digital tools: booking, scheduling, stock control.
Scenario · likelihood high (my judgement)If energy prices stay high and the franc strengthens again, expect consolidation: chains and well-capitalised groups gain, independent full-service restaurants shrink.

Go deeper in the blog post: Hospitality and retail: the crisis that has nothing to do with AI

Sector deep dive · 44% survive

12.2 Retail and trade

Squeezed from two sides: foreign platforms online and shops across the border offline.

The facts

  • Swiss retail grew only 1.0% in 2025: food +2.1%, non-food −2.7% (NielsenIQ via Handel Heute).
  • Online sales reached CHF 15.8bn, 12.5% of retail and 19.7% of non-food; 41% of retailers feel Temu and Shein strongly or moderately (Swiss Post).
  • Temu alone: about CHF 1bn Swiss sales in 2025, about 50,000 orders a day (Netzwoche). Discounters Action and Rossmann entered in 2025.

Where it goes wrong

  1. Fighting on price against platforms with global scale.
  2. Half-done digital transformation: a website without stock data, delivery or service behind it.
  3. Generalist range: nothing is a reason to visit.

How they could move

  • Compete on what platforms cannot copy: advice, fitting, repair, rental, local speed, trusted Swiss standards.
  • Use marketplaces as a channel: Swiss retailers can sell on Temu itself since September 2025.
  • Narrow the range to a niche and own it.
Scenario · likelihood medium (my judgement)If Switzerland tightens rules on foreign platforms, as the Council of States has demanded, non-food shops get modest relief before 2028. If not, independent non-food retail keeps shrinking.

Go deeper in the blog post: Hospitality and retail: the crisis that has nothing to do with AI

Sector deep dive · 51% survive

12.3 Construction and specialised trades

Small firms fail on cash flow and pricing, not on lack of work.

The facts

  • Construction is among the sectors most affected by bankruptcies in 2026, with trade and hospitality (Creditreform via cash.ch).
  • New specialised construction firms rose 5.8% in 2023 (BFS): demand for trades remains solid. SECO expected construction investment to grow about 1.6% in 2026.

Where it goes wrong

  1. Underpriced fixed-price bids that carry material and labour cost increases.
  2. Cash-flow blindness: late payments in, wages and suppliers out.
  3. One general contractor provides most revenue.
  4. No succession plan.

How they could move

  • Protect margins in the contract: price-adjustment clauses, deposits, stage payments.
  • Specialise in lasting demand, such as renovation and energy-efficiency upgrades.
  • Spread customer risk.
  • Simple digital tools for estimating and invoicing.
ScenarioA single 0.25-point SNB rate rise in December 2026, as KOF expects, would have only a small effect. Cost discipline matters far more than interest rates for small trades firms.

Sector deep dive · 46% survive

12.4 IT services and software

If AI does part of the coding, selling hours becomes selling less.

The facts

  • New IT services firms fell 7.1% in 2023 (BFS), while ICT venture capital rose almost 150% in 2025 to CHF 774m (SVCR): money returned, to fewer, larger companies.
  • ICT has the highest AI use of any sector, and is the only one where AI is often the business model (UBS).
  • Only 34% of SMEs have AI data rules; only 2% of micro-firms use AI systematically.

Where it goes wrong

  1. Billing by the hour while AI speeds up the work: productivity gains go to the client.
  2. Generic positioning: "we build websites and apps" competes with freelancers, offshore teams and AI tools.
  3. One large client.

How they could move

  • From hours to outcomes: packaged, fixed-price services (AI integration, security audit, data-protection setup).
  • Turn the gap into the offer: most SMEs use AI without rules; help them set it up safely, with Swiss hosting (rated 8.7/10 in importance).
  • Specialise in regulated fields: finance, health, public sector.
Scenario · likelihood high (my judgement)If AI coding tools keep improving at the current pace, revenue per developer hour falls for generic IT firms. Firms that package outcomes win.

Sector deep dive · 47% survive

12.5 Finance, fintech and crypto

Licensed firms are protected; consumer fintech and crypto ride funding and price cycles.

The facts

  • Swiss fintech rounds fell from 41 in 2024 to 30 in 2025, far below 2021–22 levels (SVCR).
  • Crypto Valley had 1,766 active blockchain firms at the end of 2025, but growth slowed to 1% a year; Zug lost four and has 715 (Crypto Valley Journal).
  • Top-50 valuation fell 21.3% to USD 467bn while funding rose 37% to USD 728m (CV VC). The ecosystem is shifting from tokens to infrastructure.

Where it goes wrong

  1. Business models tied to token prices.
  2. Underestimating regulation: licences, compliance, bank access.
  3. Consumer fintech against entrenched players (banks, Twint) without a clear edge.

How they could move

  • Sell infrastructure (compliance, custody, data) rather than chase consumers.
  • Partner with banks instead of replacing them.
  • Treat regulation as a moat, as health does.
Note · the Zug linkCrypto explains only part of the Zug puzzle: Zug has about 715 blockchain firms in total, against roughly 1,800 new companies every year. Section 2

Sector deep dive · 63% survive

12.6 Health and life sciences

The strongest sector. Its risks come from regulation and geopolitics, not competition.

The facts

  • New health companies rose 16.7% in 2023, the strongest growth of any large sector (BFS).
  • Biotech received a record CHF 946m of VC in 2025; Basel-Stadt took 57.7% (SVCR).
  • Pharma is nearly half of Swiss goods exports to the US and faces US tariffs of up to 15% since April 2026, with exceptions.
  • TARDOC replaced TARMED on 1 January 2026; doctors fear lump sums will not cover complex cases, and rural practices often find no successor (Zuger Zeitung).

Where it goes wrong

  1. The single-doctor practice carrying admin, billing change and succession alone.
  2. Single-asset biotech: one drug, one trial.
  3. Late-stage funding dependence: 88% of Swiss deep-tech rounds above USD 100m come from foreign investors (Deep Tech Report).

How they could move

  • Group practices and shared services for billing, IT and staff; easier succession.
  • Telemedicine, which TARDOC values better than TARMED did.
  • Partnering and licensing with large pharma.
Scenario · likelihood medium to high (my judgement)If US drug-pricing pressure or tariffs rise further, Basel feels it first: big pharma cuts costs, then suppliers, labs and service firms around it.

Sector deep dive · about 50% survive

12.7 Consulting, marketing and professional services

The sector most likely to see an AI-driven boom and bust.

The facts

  • Consulting was among the two largest founding categories in 2025, with 5,733 new register entries (IFJ).
  • In 2023, new consulting firms rose 3.7% and advertising and market research firms 15.8% (BFS).
  • These sectors already had the highest closure rates: 9.5 and 9.0 per 100 active firms in 2021, against 5.1 in health.

Where it goes wrong

  1. No niche: competing with everyone, including AI tools.
  2. Selling outputs AI can produce: reports, slides, posts, market overviews.
  3. No recurring revenue.
  4. The network runs dry after one or two years.

How they could move

  • Sell implementation: AI can write the deck; it cannot run the change inside a client.
  • A niche with proof: one industry or problem, with published cases.
  • Recurring revenue: retainers, managed services, training.
  • Price outcomes, not hours.
Scenario · likelihood high (my judgement)Cheap AI tools keep foundings high in consulting and marketing, and many of these firms close within two to three years. Watch the next BFS releases.

Sector deep dive · AI-replaced work

12.8 Translation, media and office services

Here the customer becomes the competitor.

The facts

  • In 2023, new publishing firms fell 14.6%, office-support firms 15.6%, design and translation firms 2.6% (BFS).
  • Translation (52%) and correspondence (47%) are the two most common uses of AI among Swiss SMEs (AXA/Sotomo): work these firms used to sell.
  • Clerical work has the highest generative-AI exposure of any occupation group (ILO 2025). Even DeepL cut a quarter of its staff in 2026.

Where it goes wrong

  1. Pricing per word or page while AI makes words almost free.
  2. Waiting for demand to return. It will not, for standard texts.

How they could move

  • Sell what carries liability: certified, legal, medical and financial translation.
  • From producing to checking: quality assurance of AI output, priced by risk.
  • Premium human service, the Klarna lesson. §8
RememberWhen customers can do the work themselves with AI, the only defensible offer is responsibility, judgement and trust.

Part 3 · Regions · 3 min read

13 Regions: the strategic reading

Each canton made a different trade-off between volume and durability.

CantonStrategic profileStrengthRiskWhat it should do
ZurichDiversified hub; 40% of Swiss VC; best survival (52.3%)Talent, capital, many sectorsHigh costs; AI pressure on a large service economyKeep the mix diverse; support firms that scale, not only those that start
ZugFormation machine; highest founding and closure ratesLow taxes, global firms, Crypto ValleyMobile, foreign-owned, cycle-driven firms leave as easily as they arriveMeasure success by survival and jobs, not registrations
LucerneQuiet improver: 48.7% → 52.0%, almost no VC, lowest closure rateStable local SMEsLow growth and innovation; few scale-upsAdd a growth layer (university spin-offs, regional investors) without losing stability
Basel-StadtLife-science cluster; 57.7% of Swiss biotech VCWorld-class pharma and biotechConcentration exposed to US tariffs and drug pricingBroaden suppliers and services beyond big pharma
BernLowest founding rate (3.8 per 1,000); near-average survivalStable, public-sector-anchoredLittle dynamismLower barriers: faster permits, founder support

Strength, risk and recommendations: my own assessment from the facts in this report.

RememberZug maximises volume; Lucerne maximises durability; Zurich manages both.

Go deeper in the blog post: Lucerne survives without venture capital

Part 3 · Scenarios · 3 min read

14 Four scenarios to 2030

The base case is an AI shake-out, with costs as the wild card.

Two forces will shape survival most: how fast AI spreads, and how turbulent the outside world gets (tariffs, energy, the franc). Crossing them gives four futures.

Turbulenttariffs, energy, franc
Cost squeezeTariffs, energy and franc hit costs first. Hospitality, retail and Basel suppliers lose. Survival dips in local sectors.
Double shockCosts and AI pressure hit at once. Exposed sectors fall below 50% survival. Capital concentrates further.
Calmstable costs
Steady recoveryGrowth near 1.6%, survival near 50%. Little change from the 2018 cohort.
AI shake-out · base caseConsulting and marketing boom, then bust. IT services shift from hours to outcomes. Adopters with clean data pull ahead.
Slow AI adoption
Fast AI adoption

Scenario map: own analysis. Likelihoods are my judgement.

Why the AI shake-out is my base case: AI adoption keeps accelerating (SME use rose from 22% to 34% in one year) while the economy grows moderately (SECO: 1.7% in 2026, 1.6% in 2027). The wild card is cost turbulence: if tariffs, energy or the franc turn against Switzerland at the same time, the double shock follows.

NoteScenarios are not forecasts. They show what to prepare for, and which signposts to watch (next section).

Go deeper in the blog post: Four scenarios for new Swiss companies to 2030

Part 3 · Trigger chains · 4 min read

15 If this happens, then what

Each trigger sets off a chain. The signposts tell you which way it is going.

TriggerFirst effectKnock-on effectWho loses / winsLikelihoodSignpost
SNB +0.25 pts, Dec 2026Slightly dearer borrowingMarginal pressure on construction, real estateSmall overallHighSNB decision
US raises pharma tariffs or presses drug pricesBig pharma cuts costsFewer orders for Basel suppliers and labsBasel loses mostMed–highUS rulings; pharma results
Franc strengthens as a safe havenMore shopping and holidays abroadFewer guests and shoppers at homeHospitality, retail, exporters loseMediumEUR/CHF; SNB
Energy stays high (Middle East)Higher operating costsThinner margins, more closuresHospitality, transport loseMediumEnergy prices
AI agents mature quicklyLess paid office, translation, basic IT workOne-person consulting boom, then closuresAI-native firms winHighBFS foundings by industry
AI valuations correctFewer, smaller AI roundsCapital flows back to non-AI startupsFintech, cleantech, hardware winMediumAI share of VC
Swiss rules on foreign platformsHigher costs for Temu, SheinSome sales return to Swiss shopsNon-food retail wins a littleMediumParliament
TARDOC underpays complex careSolo practices lose money on complex casesConsolidation into group practicesGroups win, solo practices loseMed–highFMH evaluations
Bankruptcy-law effect fades, 2027Bankruptcy numbers fallHeadlines call it a recovery; part is statisticalReaders who check the methodHighD&B, Creditreform

Likelihood ratings: my own judgement based on the facts in this report.

RememberThe chains connect. A stronger franc, high energy prices and AI pressure can hit the same small firm at once. That compounding turns a difficult year into a closure.

Part 3 · Recommendations · 4 min read

16 Recommendations and an agile playbook

Survive the first five years by keeping early bets small and reversible, and build barriers competitors and AI cannot easily cross.

WhoWhat to do
FoundersDo not start alone: start with a partner or a first hire. Choose a niche with a barrier (skills, licence, trust). Test demand before signing long leases or large contracts.
SME ownersPut AI on back-office tasks first, with data rules in place. Track cash runway and unit costs monthly. Share fixed costs with peers.
InvestorsLook past AI labels: ask what part of the value survives when AI tools get cheaper. Non-AI startups trade at lower valuations, which can be an opportunity.
CantonsMeasure economic health by survival and jobs, not registrations. Publish canton-by-sector survival data. Support years two and three, not only the founding.
ConsultantsSell implementation and measurable outcomes. Run pre-mortems on every large client bet, especially AI rollouts.

An agile playbook for small firms

Side noteAgile and Scrum come from software, but their core idea fits any small firm: make change in small steps you can reverse, and inspect results often.
  1. Pre-mortem: before a big commitment, imagine it failed a year from now and list why. Fix the top three reasons first.
  2. Smallest test first: a pop-up instead of a lease, a pilot instead of a rollout, one client instead of a launch.
  3. Short cycles: review every two to four weeks, like a Scrum sprint, and decide to continue, change or stop.
  4. Kill criteria in advance: decide before starting what result means stop.
  5. Readiness check (McKinsey 7S): strategy, structure, systems, shared values, style, staff and skills must all support the change, not just the technology.
  6. Lead change step by step (Kotter): urgency, a small owning team, and visible quick wins. Most transformations fail when no early win is visible.
  7. Balance the portfolio (Three Horizons): most effort on the core, some on extending it, a small share on new bets.
RememberAgile methods turn one big, irreversible bet into many small, reversible experiments. That is exactly what a 70% success rate requires. Section 8

Go deeper in the blog post: What I would tell a founder, an investor and a canton

Part 4: Limits and conclusion

Part 4 · Limits · 2 min read

17 What the data cannot tell us

Five limits that shape how far these findings go.

  1. Patterns, not causes. The data shows that small starts survive less, not that hiring would make a company survive. Every "why" in this report is a hypothesis until tested.
  2. A two-year lag. BFS survival data ends in 2023. The 2022–23 rate rise, the 2025 bankruptcy-law change and the AI wave are not fully visible yet.
  3. No canton-by-sector view. BFS publishes survival by canton or by sector, not both. I cannot say whether Zug's ICT firms do worse than Zurich's.
  4. Closure is not always failure. A company can close because it was sold, merged or its owner retired.
  5. Different sector definitions in BFS and the VC report; VC figures for Bern and Lucerne are minimums.

Part 4 · Due diligence · 4 min read

18 Data due diligence: five headlines that mislead

Before using any number, ask: who was counted, what counted as success, over what time, and who published it?

ClaimSourceReliabilityWeak point
Survival by canton, sector, sizeBFS company demographyHighTwo-year lag; holdings excluded
Founding and closure trends by industryBFS STAT-TABHighOnly 2023 is after ChatGPT
VC by canton and sectorSwiss Venture Capital Report 2026HighDisclosed rounds only
AI share of Swiss VCEY Startup Barometer 2026Med–highEY defines "AI startup"
AI adoption in firmsAXA/Sotomo, UBS, KOF, HWZ, BFSMediumEach defines "using AI" differently
AI project returnsMIT, IBM, McKinsey, S&P, GoogleMediumSelective samples, self-reporting
AI exposure of jobsILO 2025HighExposure is a ceiling, not job loss
Solo-founder trendCartaLow for CHUS, venture-backed only

Five gaps between headlines and reality

  1. "Record company foundings" include paper companies. Register counts include holdings, among the largest groups of new entries. BFS, counting only operating firms, showed foundings flat in 2023.
  2. "Record bankruptcies" are partly a legal effect. Since 2025, tax and social-insurance claims go through bankruptcy proceedings; Dun & Bradstreet says comparisons with earlier years are no longer valid.
  3. "60% of firms use AI" does not mean AI works there. Adoption ranges from about 8% of small firms (KOF) to about 60% of all firms (UBS), with 2% of micro-firms using it systematically.
  4. AI success rates contradict each other, from 5% to 74%. Section 8
  5. Even the totals disagree. EY puts Swiss VC at more than CHF 3.3bn in 2025; the SVCR at CHF 2.95bn.

Go deeper in the blog post: Five headlines that are not what they seem

Part 4 · Conclusion · 2 min read

19 Conclusion

Why half of new Swiss companies close within five years, and what the other half do differently.

New Swiss companies mostly fail because of how they start and which market they enter, not because of where they are or how much money they raise.

1. StartSolo 49% vs teams of 10+ 68%. Capital and a team at the start are the strongest protection.
2. MarketEasy-entry, crowded sectors survive worst; sectors protected by qualifications survive best.
3. PlaceLocation matters less, mostly through the type of company a place attracts.
4. MoneyVC reaches a few hundred of 46,000+ new firms a year; it does not explain survival.
5. AINot yet the main cause, but crowding knowledge work and concentrating capital.
→ So whatStart with a team, pick a market with a barrier, keep early bets small and reversible.
RememberThe survivors start with a team, enter a market with a real barrier or stable demand, and keep their early bets small and reversible.

What I will research next

  • Zug: how much of its churn comes from foreign-owned and mobile companies.
  • Lucerne: how its companies survive without venture capital.
  • AI in Swiss SMEs: a short survey of what firms tried, what they dropped, and why, to close the research gap in Section 8.
  • 2027 update: rerun the analysis when BFS publishes the next cohorts.

Sources

  1. Eurostat, Key figures on European business: business dynamics (EU 5-year survival benchmark)
  2. BFS, Company demography: survival rates
  3. BFS, New enterprises and survival
  4. BFS STAT-TAB, Company demography by canton and industry, 2013–2023
  5. Swiss Venture Capital Report 2026, startupticker.ch and SECA
  6. SECO, Economic forecasts, September 2026
  7. EY Startup Barometer Switzerland 2026
  8. Swiss Deep Tech Report 2026. deeptechnation.ch ; summary via AG Navigator
  9. AXA/Sotomo SME study 2025, via the federal SME portal
  10. UBS/Intervista AI survey of 2,500 Swiss firms, via Netzwoche
  11. KOF ETH Zurich, digital technology in small firms
  12. ILO Working Paper 140, Generative AI and jobs, 2025
  13. KPMG and University of Melbourne, Trust in AI 2025
  14. EY Switzerland, AI and trust survey
  15. MIT NANDA, The GenAI Divide 2025, summary
  16. S&P Global 2025 figures, compiled
  17. Google Cloud vs MIT methodology comparison
  18. IBM CEO Study 2025
  19. McKinsey State of AI 2025, summary
  20. Crunchbase data on AI share of venture capital, via GCN
  21. Carta, Founder Ownership Report 2026
  22. Klarna reverses AI-only customer service, Entrepreneur, May 2025
  23. DeepL cuts 250 jobs, Tages-Anzeiger, 2026
  24. economiesuisse, US tariffs and the Swiss economy
  25. KOF forecast and SNB outlook, via finews
  26. GastroSuisse/KOF business survey Q1 2026
  27. Restaurant closures and their causes, Blick
  28. NielsenIQ retail study 2025, via Handel Heute
  29. Swiss Post, Swiss e-commerce 2025
  30. Temu and Shein in Switzerland, Netzwoche
  31. Creditreform, foundings and bankruptcies H1 2026, via cash.ch
  32. Dun & Bradstreet, bankruptcies and the law change, via Moneycab
  33. Crypto Valley Top 50 Report 2026, Crypto Valley Journal
  34. CV VC press release, April 2026
  35. TARDOC and GP succession, Zuger Zeitung